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Monitoring temperatures during tunnel fires is of major importance for both the firefighters extinguishing the 
fire, and the engineers in charge of the subsequent repair work. However, current methods of assessing fire 
damage have limitations when applied to tunnels and only provide estimates of the maximum fire 
temperatures at specific locations of the tunnel. This is not a desirable situation, as the temperature-time 
curves associated with the fire event should be available for use in assessing the residual strength of the 
tunnel structure. This is the key parameter in defining repair work and the length of time the tunnel will need 
to be closed and thus the socio-economic cost of the tunnel fire.  In addition, real-time recording of the 
temperature-time curves would provide valuable information to the firefighters engaged in extinguishing the 
fire.  
This paper presents a new general methodology for the optimal placement of sensors in a tunnel to obtain the 
temperature evolution at any point along its lining during a fire. The methodology was applied to the Virgolo 
Tunnel in Italy, in which 100 potential high-temperature sensor configurations were tested and a set of 
optimal sensor configurations was proposed. The results of the analysis show that: (a) the proper location of 
the sensors is crucial; (b) it is possible to define a set of sensor configurations that minimize the cost of the 
monitoring system and maximize the accuracy of the estimated temperatures; (c) it is important to place at 
least three high-temperature sensors in each monitored cross section (at the crown and symmetrically on the 
haunches/side walls). The proposed methodology improves tunnel resilience against fires, as it enables safer 
infrastructure and a faster and more economic recovery of the tunnel after a fire event.  
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The fires that broke out in the Mont Blanc tunnel in 1999, in the St. Gotthard tunnel in 2001, the Burnlet 
tunnel in 2007 and the Wuxi Lihu tunnel in 2010 had catastrophic consequences in terms of loss of life and 
economic costs and aroused public interest in tunnel fire safety. They also gave rise to significant research in 
the field of tunnel fires (see e.g. Safe Tunnel 2005, FIT 2005, NCHRP 2011,Beard and Carvel 2012, Lai et 
al. 2014, Barbato et al. 2014and Ingason et al. 2015) with the aim of reducing fire risk in tunnels.  
In the technical field of risk engineering, the term ‘risk’ is defined as the product of the probability of an event 
and the expected outcome—typically expressed as damage—of the event (Hardy, 2005). In the case of 
tunnel fires, adverse outcomes may include loss of life and injuries to victims, direct costs in the form of 
repairs and indirect costs in the form of loss of toll revenues and the economic impact on the region due to 
tunnel closure. To reduce fire risks, several prevention and protection measures have been developed to 
reduce the probability of tunnel fires, to ensure early fire detection and to keep loss of life and damage to a 
minimum (see Beard and Carvel, 2012). As regards the economic costs, the following aspects need to be 
considered: 
• It is always cheaper to repair a tunnel after a fire than build a new one, since construction times and 
costs are higher if a new tunnel is built than if the tunnel is repaired (Corsi, 2008).  
• Indirect costs due to tunnel closure after a fire are usually much higher than the direct costs associated 
with repairs (Corsi, 2008). For example, the 1996 fire in the Eurotunnel linking France and the United 
Kingdom was responsible for €87 million in repair work and €211 million in lost revenue (Peter, 2000).  
Therefore, in order to reduce the cost of tunnel fires it is essential to reduce closure times. This can be 
achieved through better and faster assessment of damage to the structure, as this assessment specifies the 
areas in need of repair and the methods to be used. However, assessing fire damage in a tunnel is a 
challenging task, especially when concrete linings are used, as the assessment involves non-destructive or  
destructive techniques and estimating the temperature-time curves associated with the fire event to calculate 
the residual strength of the structure (Corsi, 2008). Yet, the application of non-destructive techniques in 
tunnels is limited due to the non-verticality of the tunnel walls and the roughness of the tunnel surfaces 
(Felicetti, 2013). In addition, these methods do not give any information about the intensity and duration of 
the fire and the temperature-time curves associated with it. These are key parameters in assessing the 
damage to the tunnel structure and obtaining them can be difficult, as has been reported by several authors 
(Niels et al. 2008, Calavera et al. 2005 and Wang et al. 2014).  
Within this context, this paper proposes a new methodology to increase the resilience of tunnels against 
fires, i.e., to increase the capacity of tunnels to withstand fires with minimum losses and to recuperate a 
specific tunnel service level as fast as possible (see Bocchini et al., 2014 for a broad discussion on the 
resilience of civil infrastructure). The proposed methodology combines high-temperature sensors in certain 
sections of the tunnel with numerical models of different fire events to estimate the temperature-time curves 
imposed by a fire at any point on the tunnel surface.   The methodology can be applied to both new and 
existing tunnels and provides optimal monitoring solutions, i.e., solutions that provide the maximum 
information at a minimum cost.  
Section 2 of the paper contains a general description of the method, Section 3 validates the method with a 
case study on the Virgolo tunnel, and Section 4 details the main conclusions of the research carried out. 
2. Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to present a monitoring strategy that increases the resilience of tunnels against fires. 
Defining this monitoring strategy involves: (a) designing the sensor network, i.e. deciding on the sensor 
layout; (b) defining the data treatment, i.e. the information to be obtained from the raw sensor data; and (c) 
evaluating the total cost of the system. As there are an infinite number of sensor configurations, the 
monitoring problem also has infinite solutions, so that the final choice depends on the characteristics of the 
tunnel under study (geometry, importance, traffic, etc.) and any financial or political constraints. The general 
procedure for defining monitoring strategy can be divided into the following steps: 
1. Step 1. Data collection. First of all, all the available data on the tunnel under study should be 
gathered and analyzed. This should include the tunnel geometry (type of cross section, dimensions, 
length, etc.), the materials and fire protection used, existing firefighting protocols, ventilation systems 
and the characteristics of the traffic going through the tunnel. 
 
2. Step 2. Definition of possible fire scenarios. Defining fire scenarios involves determining: fire load, 
characterized by its location in the tunnel, its size and  Heat Release Rate (HRR) as a function of 
time. The HRR is the  rate at which heat is generated by fire. If there is no traffic restriction, the nine 
fire scenarios proposed by Inganson (2006) can be used as the starting point. 
 
3. Step 3. Numerical modeling of fire scenarios. Models of the most critical fire scenarios are built using 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) techniques. CFDs models can be built with different software 
packages. In this study we used the Fire Dynamic Simulator software (FDS henceforth) (Mc Grattan, 
2010), developed at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the USA. To build 
a CFD model with FDS we must define: (1) a control volume with its boundary conditions 
representing the volume for which the entire analysis is carried out; (2) the geometry included in the 
control volume which represents the geometry of the case study; (3) a mesh or discretization of the 
control volume; (4) material properties (conductivity, density, specific heat and emissivity); (5) fire 
sources; (6) a combustion model; and (7) the outputs of the model. FDS can provide several outputs, 
such as gas temperatures, gas velocity and smoke density. In the monitoring strategy presented in 
this paper, temperatures are the outputs of the CFD models as they are aimed at providing the 
evolution of gas temperatures with time for each fire scenario at specific points in the tunnel. 
 
4. Step 4. Proposal of temperature sensor configurations. In the proposed monitoring strategy, 
temperature sensors such as high temperature thermocouples or the high temperature fiber optic 
sensors developed by Rinaudo et al. (2015a) are located near the internal surface of the tunnel at 
equidistant cross sections. To define a sensor configuration, the following parameters need to be 
established: the number Nx of monitored cross sections and their separation nx, the number Ny of 
sensors placed at each monitored cross section, and the location of these Ny sensors within each 
monitored cross section. Fig.1 shows an example of a sensor configuration in which six cross 
sections are monitored by five sensors arranged as displayed in Fig. 1c. It should be remembered 
that sensor layout is a key parameter, since for each number of sensors many different 
configurations are possible and each one will have a specific performance and cost.  
 
5. Step 5. Assessment of the performance of each proposed sensor configuration. For this, it is 
assumed that CFD models predict accurate values of the temperature-time curves at all points in the 
tunnel and for each fire scenario considered. The basic assessment procedure has two steps: 
5.1 Calculation of temperatures in a grid of points (“interpolation grid” henceforth) close to the 
tunnel surface. Using different interpolation techniques, the temperatures in the grid shown in 
Fig. 1 are obtained for each fire scenario using the temperatures at the sensor locations as 
input data. To simplify this process, the tunnel surface is unrolled to transform the 3D coordinate 
system (x,y,z) to a 2-D coordinate system (x,y*) as shown in Fig.1b.   
5.2 Definition and evaluation of error indexes and selection of an interpolation technique. For 
each interpolation technique and fire scenario and every point on the grid, the temperatures 
obtained by interpolation are compared to those obtained by the CFD models. This comparison 
provides the values of the error indexes that measure the overall error associated with each 
interpolation technique. The interpolation technique with the smallest error is then selected as 
the best technique to estimate fire temperatures. 
6. Step 6. Comparison of error indexes versus cost. Sensor configurations are compared as regards 
their precision (error indexes) and cost (measured indirectly through the total number of sensors in 
the configuration), after which a set of optimal monitoring configurations is proposed. Note that a set 
of solutions and not a single solution is obtained since a multi-objective evaluation (precision versus 
cost) is carried out. 
The above mentioned steps are explained in detail in Section 3, when the method is applied to the Virgolo 
Tunnel as a case study. 
 
3. Case study: the Virgolo Tunnel 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
The Virgolo road tunnel is on the Brennero highway near Bolzano in northern Italy. It has two tubes with two 
lanes per tube and a total length of 860m. It has a horse-shoe cross section with reinforced concrete linings, 
as shown in Fig. 2. The cross section is 6.5m high, 10 m wide, with an area of 54m
2
. The tunnel has a 1% 
gradient and is almost completely straight with no sharp curves. According to Kelly (2008), an average of 
9300 vehicles pass through it daily, 10% of these being heavy goods vehicles (HGV) and 2.5% carry 
dangerous goods. The tunnel has a radio communications system, telephones and fire extinguishers. 
However, it is not equipped with  forced ventilation or a fire warning system. 
This tunnel was the subject of several fire tests within the framework of the European UPTUN Project (cost 
effective, sustainable and innovative upgrading methods for fire Safety in existing tunnels). Detailed 
information on these tests can be found in Bergmeister ( 2006). The results from these tests were analyzed 
in detail by Rinaudo et. al (2015b), who also developed and validated a CFD model to explain the tunnel’s 
response to fires. This CFD model will be used in the following sections to define the monitoring strategy 
proposed in this paper.  
3.2. Fire scenarios 
Fire scenarios are defined by their HRR curves, the size of the fire loads and by the position of the fire loads 
in the tunnel. In this study, nine different HRR curves for different types of road vehicles were considered in 
accordance with the recommendations of Opstad et al. (2006), Inganson (2006) and Caliendo et al.(2012). 
These curves represent fire events ranging from a small fire in a car to a severe blaze caused for example 
by a tanker.  
Fig.3a shows a typical proposed HRR curve along with its defining parameters. The HRR curve has three 
phases: an initial linear fire growth phase, a steady state phase, and a final phase of linear fire decay. The 
linear growth is defined by the slope ,   of the straight line that represents it. The steady state phase is 
defined by the value of the peak HRR , and the decay phase is defined by the slope , of the straight 
line that represents it. Table 1 details the fire scenarios, the main values defining the HRR curves and fire 
load sizes used in this study; ,is equal to 10MW/min for  up to 30 MW and equal to 20MW/min for  
higher than 30 MW. The time tD of beginning of the decay phase and the total duration of the fire td are based 
on the French recommendations (PIAC, 1999). Finally, the time tmax to reach  can be obtained with Eq. 1: 
 = 	,           Eq. 1 
In the CFD analyses all the fire loads were located in the middle section of the tunnel, i.e., the cross section 
with x coordinate equal to 430 m. Two fire positions were considered for each HRR curve: one in which the 
fire sources were centered at the cross section, and another with fire sources centered in a traffic lane, so 
that a total of 18 CFD models were built. These models simulated a 30-minute fire duration, after which time 
it was assumed that the firefighting service would intervene. This 30 minute duration results in a steady state 
phase of fully developed fires of between 20 and 29.5 minutes, according to the type of fire source. Figure 3b 
shows the resulting HRR curves. 
In addition, for each sensor configuration and fire scenario, two possible fire load locations were considered 
with respect to the relative position of the fire load and the monitoring system (Fig.4). The first considers the 
most favorable scenario from the point of view of the monitoring system, in which the fire occurs in a 
monitored cross section. The second is the most unfavorable scenario, with the fire midway between two 
monitored cross sections.  
3.3. Computational Fluid Dynamic Models 
Advanced Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) models were developed to simulate the fire scenarios in the 
tunnel. FDS software (McGrattan et al.2010) was chosen to model the fire event because it has been widely 
tested on tunnel fires (see for example the works of McGrattan (2006) and Cheong et al. (2009)).The 
software solves numerically a large eddy simulation form of the Navier–Stokes equations with the emphasis 
on smoke and heat transport. 
The sensitivity analysis performed showed that the entire tunnel structure had to be included in the model. 
As a consequence a control volume measuring 10.2 x 7 x 860 m was defined. The longitudinal axis of the 
tunnel corresponds to the x axis of the FDS model, and the section with the x coordinate equal to 0 is located 
at the tunnel’s midway point. Different combinations of meshes and cell sizes were studied to define a mesh 
with cell sizes small enough to properly model the fire but coarse enough to run the model efficiently. The 
470 m long central part of the tunnel was modeled with cells measuring 0.2x0.2x0.2m, and cells measuring 
0.4x0.2x0.2m were used for the rest of the tunnel. The resulting number of parallelepiped cells in the control 
volume was 5,099,400. 
Fig.5 shows the geometry of the model. Since it is not possible to construct a curved geometry in FDS, the 
tunnel cross section was defined using rectangular obstructions and the “saw tooth” option was used to 
prevent vortices from being generated at the sharp corners (McGrattan, 2010). The direction of gravity was 
modified in the model to include the tunnel’s 1% gradient. 
An initial temperature of 20ºC throughout the tunnel was set at the beginning of all the fire simulations. The 
two tunnel ends were defined as FDS open boundary conditions. Concrete material with thermal properties 
according to Eurocode2 (CEN-EN 2-1-1, 2004) was assigned to all tunnel linings.  
The perimeter of the tunnel cross section was divided into segments measuring 1.04 m along the perimeter, 
resulting in 17 equidistant points with an angle of 12°, as shown in Fig. 6. At each of these points, FDS gas 
temperature measuring devices (“sensors” in FDS terminology) were placed at a distance of 0.05 m from the 
tunnel intrados. This FDS sensor layout was repeated every meter in the longitudinal direction, giving a total 
of 14,603 devices (17x859) and defined a grid similar to the one shown in Fig. 1c. 
The fire load was modeled using the mixture fraction combustion model proposed by FDS (McGrattan, 
2010). The fire sources were modeled as a rectangular obstruction with a burner on the upper surface. The 
dimension of the obstruction was defined for each fire model according to Table 1. For each model a heat 
release rate per unit area (HRRPUA) was defined dividing the peak HRR by its corresponding burning area. 
The curves increase linearly from 0 to their maximum values (HRRPUAMAX) in tmax and remained constant 
until tD. 
All the FDS models were run as an MPI parallel job on a cluster for massively parallel processing, which 
consists of 72 nodes. The nodes in the cluster were BX920S3 Fujitsu on a BX900S2 blade chassis. Each 
node of the chassis had two Intel Xeon E5-2450 8c / 16T and 64 GB / RAM DDR3 (ratio 4GB / core). The 
resources assigned were 13 cores and 8 GB RAM per core. A typical simulation took between 66 and 112 
hours depending on the fire size. Gas temperatures, obtained from a grid of 14,603 points similar to the one 
displayed in Fig. 1c were retained as the output of the FDS analyses. 
 
3.4. Temperature sensor configurations considered. 
Typical fire detection systems in tunnels, such as linear heat detection systems, are usually installed close to 
the intrados of the tunnel and/or at the mid-height of the lateral walls. These configurations might work 
properly to detect the beginning of a fire, but, as this study will show, a detailed analysis is required to define 
the number and layout of the sensors needed to get an adequate estimation of the temperature-time curves 
in a tunnel lining resulting from a fire event. The definition of these curves is critical, because: (a) they 
provide information that enables firefighters to work more safely, and (b) enable proper estimation of the 
damage to the tunnel and proper definition of any required repair work, which in turn means shorter times for 
re-opening a tunnel after a fire. 
Defining a sensor configuration involves establishing: (a) the number of sensors Ny  in each monitored cross 
section; (b) the layout of the sensors in the tunnel monitored cross section; and (c) the distance nx along the 
longitudinal axis of the tunnel between two consecutive monitored cross sections. Configurations with a 
number of sensors Ny of between three and seven, and with longitudinal separation nx of 5, 10, 15 and 20m 
were considered in this study. The proposed configurations are divided into 20 groups. These groups are a 
combination of the five possible values of the number of sensors with the four possible separation values 
along the length of the tunnel. For each group, five different sensor layouts cross section (see Fig. 7) were 
considered, which resulted in a total of 100 different sensor configurations. The layout of the sensors within 
the cross section was based on two considerations:  i) the points at which fires reached the maximum 
temperatures, and ii) the points that provide critical information for the interpolation methods.  
Each configuration was identified according to the sensor layout in the cross section and the longitudinal 
separation between sensors. For example the configuration with three sensors in the cross section, located 
at points “c”, “k” and “r” in Fig. 7, and with a longitudinal separation nx of 5m is labeled “ckr 5”. Fig. 7 shows 
the 25 basic sensor configurations studied.  
3.5. Interpolation methods 
Each FDS model of a fire event provides temperatures as a function of time at each point on a grid of 14,603 
points, similar to the one shown in Fig. 1c and including the full tunnel length. These temperatures are called 
true temperatures henceforth, because the analysis assumes that they perfectly match the temperatures in 
the tunnel caused by the fire event. Fig. 8 shows an example of the true temperatures for a fire in a heavy 
goods vehicle (scenario HRR 100) at the center of the central cross section of the tunnel 15 min after the 
start of the fire. Fig. 8a shows a 3D representation of the true temperatures in the central 200m of the tunnel. 
Fig. 8b and Fig, 8c plot the temperatures in the tunnel central cross section and in a 200 m  longitudinal 
section respectively. 
However, as temperature sensors are placed at specific points in the tunnel, estimating the temperature-time 
curves at any given point involves interpolating the temperatures measured by a specific sensor 
configuration. This study tested five exact interpolation methods. The term “exact” means that the 
temperatures predicted by the interpolation method at the sensor positions are equal to the temperatures 
actually measured by the sensors. These five methods are (Moler, 2008 and Bohling, 2005):  
• Piecewise linear interpolation, which connects known temperature points with straight lines and then 
uses these lines to interpolate the temperatures at any point. 
• Nearest neighbor interpolation, which assigns to each point the temperature measured by the 
nearest sensor. 
• Piecewise cubic hermite interpolation, which is similar to the piecewise linear interpolation but using 
a third order polynomial function that preserves the shape of the data (measured temperatures) as 
interpolation functions.  
• Cubic spline interpolation, which use cubic splines with continuous second derivate as interpolation 
functions.  
• Kriging interpolation method, which is based on regression against observed values of surrounding 
data points, weighted according to spatial covariance values. 
The first four methods are deterministic, i.e. they do not provide any estimation of possible errors, while the 
Kriging is stochastic, i.e., it gives an estimation of the errors. 
All the interpolation methods were applied using Matlab functions (Matlab 2011a). For piecewise linear, 
nearest neighbor, piecewise cubic hermite and cubic spline methods (henceforth, Linear, Nearest, Cubic and 
Spline); the interp2 function (Moler, 2008) was used and the Matlab toolbox DACE (Lophavenet at. 2002) 
was used to apply the Kriging method. This method was applied using a zero order polynomial regression 
function and a cubic spline correlation function. Two sets of values were assigned to the correlation 
functions, resulting in two variants  known as Kriging A and Kriging B. Fig. 9 shows an example of the 
temperatures estimated by all the interpolation methods for the HRR 100 fire scenario (fire in a heavy goods 
vehicle) 15 min after the beginning of the fire at the center of the tunnel central cross section, at the mid-
point between two sections monitored with the “ckr20” sensor configuration. 
The performance of the interpolation methods was assessed by the error indexes defined in Section 3.6. 
When several methods had a similar error index, the computing time required to perform the interpolation 
was the second selection criterion for the best interpolation method. According to this last criteria, the best 
method was the nearest neighbor interpolation, followed by the cubic spline interpolation, the Kriging, the 
piecewise linear interpolation and the cubic interpolation. 
3.6. Assessment of the interpolation methods 
Different interpolation methods can be assessed by evaluating their errors, these being defined based on the 
differences between the temperatures estimated by interpolation and the true temperatures. As the 
temperatures are interpolated on a point grid similar to the one shown in Fig. 1, the errors of each 
interpolation method are defined by a matrix in which each component represents the error at a given point 
of the interpolation grid. In addition, the matrix components change with time, as both the true and the 
measured temperatures are a function of time. However, it is advisable to reduce all the errors to a single 
scalar value to facilitate the comparison of the interpolation methods. 
The mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE) were chosen  to summarize the 
error matrix into a scalar. MAE provides an average of the absolute differences between the estimated 
temperatures and the true temperatures, while RMSE represents the standard deviation of this difference. 
Both MAE and RMSE are widely used in academic research. Previous applications include, for instance, the 
evaluation of air temperature interpolations (see e.g. Willmott et al. (2006), Saz-Sánchez et al. (2010)). 
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Where T  is the estimated temperature for point i, is the true temperature for point i and n is the 
number of points on the interpolation grid. Since the fire is at the mid-point of the tunnel and the maximum 
temperatures, and consequently the maximum differences between the interpolated and true temperatures 
are near the fire, a distance of 200 m was considered to calculate the errors, which gave a value of n equal 
to 3400 points. To obtain errors which were not time-dependent, and considering that 600s after the start of 
the fire all the FDS models were in the steady-state phase, the average of the errors from 600s to 1800s was 
chosen. 
In addition, and from the engineering point of view, it is important to minimize the relative error in the areas 
where the temperatures are higher than 300ºC and 600ºC. The former is the temperature at which concrete 
starts to experience a significant loss of compressive strength, and the latter is the temperature at which 
concrete loses all its structural strength (Concrete Society 2008). Two further error indexes were thus 
defined: mean absolute error of the relative error for points with a true temperature higher than 300ºC 
(MAE(RE300)) and mean absolute error of the relative error for points with a true temperature higher than 























       Eq. 5 
 
Where  and  are the number of points with a true temperature higher than 300 and 600ºC, 
respectively. 
As the interpolation method that gives the best results can vary with the sensor configuration, the six 
interpolation methods proposed were assessed according to the error indexes defined by Eq. 2 to Eq., 5 
considering the nine fire loads in Table 1, two different positions of the fire load in the tunnel cross section, 
and two relative positions between fire and sensors, so that 36 different values of each error index were 
obtained for each sensor configuration.  
The error indexes associated with each interpolation method were represented by box-and-whisker plots 
(see Fig. 10 for an example related to the configuration “clmr5”). The central red line in each plot represents 
the median of the error index of the interpolation method analyzed; the lower and upper blue lines represent 
the first and third quartiles respectively of the data represented. The distance between the first and third 
quartiles is known as the interquartile range, and the dashed black lines are the whiskers, which extend to 
the most extreme data points not considered outliers. The outlier values, which are represented as small red 
crosses, are further than 1.5 times the interquartile range. The plots in Fig. 10 show that the “cubic” and 
“spline” interpolation methods have the lowest errors of all the error indexes defined. However, these box-
and-whisker plots do not show whether or not the differences are statistically significant. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Stephens and Murray 2002), which is a nonparametric version of the  one-way 
ANOVA, was used for each error index to determine whether any interpolation method was significantly 
different from the others. For example, this test found that there were significant differences among the 
interpolation methods for the ‘clmr5’ configuration. Multiple comparison tests (Stephens and Murray 2002) 
were then done to determine the methods with significant differences.  
The results showed that for the RMSE and the MAE, the “nearest” method had significant differences with 
the“Cubic” and “Spline” methods. For the MAE(RE300) and the MAE(RE600), the ”Cubic” and “Spline” 
methods presented significant differences from the rest of the methods, but did not differ significantly from 
each other. According to these results, specific to this sensor configuration, “Spline” was the best 
interpolation method, as it was significantly better than the “nearest” and had lower computing times than the 
“Cubic”. 
This procedure was repeated for all the sensor configurations and it was found that the “Nearest interpolation 
method” always had significant differences from the others, especially for the MAE(RE300) and 
MAE(RE600) error indexes. Kriging methods improved their results in configurations with larger numbers of 
sensors, but they were never significantly better than the Spline or Cubic methods. Accordingly, the Spline 
method was chosen as the best interpolation method for all sensor configurations because of its shorter 
computing times (it had the second lowest computing times after Nearest). 
 
3.7.  Selecting the best sensor distribution for each group 
The aim of this step was to select the configurations with the best sensor layout for a given number of 
sensors in a cross section and a given separation between the monitored cross sections. In the case under 
study, as explained in Section 3.4 and Fig. 7, 20 groups of five sensor layouts were analyzed. 
In order to find the sensor configuration  of each group that minimizes the errors for most of the fire events 
considered, the error indexes associated with each configuration were plotted against the fire scenarios. It is 
important to highlight that for each configuration and for each value of HRR, four points had to be plotted, as 
there were two possible fire locations within the tunnel cross section and two possible relative positions 
between sensors and fire. As an example, Fig.11 shows the results for configurations with three sensors in 
the cross section and a longitudinal separation of 5m. 
The following comments can be made on these results:  
• RMSE and MAE increase with HRR, whereas MAE(RE300) and MAE(RE600) tend to decrease with 
HRR. This is because the number of temperature values used to obtain RMSE and MAE is always 
the same and does not depend on HRR. However, the number of temperature values used to obtain 
MAE(RE300) and MAE(RE600) increases with HRR because higher HRRs produce higher 
temperatures in the tunnel. This means an increase in the number of values used to calculate 
MAE(RE300) and MAE(RE600). Consequently, according to Eqs. 4 and 5, there is a tendency for 
these error indexes to decrease. This pattern was observed in all the configurations analyzed. 
• Some configurations (“fko 5” for example) show much better behavior when the MAE(RE300) and 
MAE(RE600) indexes are analyzed than when RMSE and MAE are considered. This could appear 
contradictory, but is explained by the fact that for these configurations the highest differences 
between the estimated and the true temperatures occur at points on the interpolation grid where 
temperatures are lower than 300ºC and these points are not used to calculate MAE(RE300) and 
MAE(RE600).  
• The lowest RMSE values are obtained when the sensors are located according to the “ckr5” 
configuration. In this case, the errors vary between 7.5 and 91.8ºC, according to the HRR. The 
values of the RMSE vary between 6.58 and 112.3 °C for the “dkq 5” configuration, between 
10.39and 109.2 °C for “bks 5” , between 9.3 and 137.7 °C for “ekp 5”, and between 12.76 and 
146.2°C for “fko 5”. 
• MAE errors show minor differences among the sensors layouts, with “ckr 5”, “dkq 5” and“ekp 5” 
showing similar values. The maximum MAE for these configurations is 55.2 °C, 51.5 °C and 56.2 °C, 
respectively. 
• The values of MAE(RE300) are similar in all cases. The “bks 5” has the highest MAE(RE300) 
variation (values between 4.3% and 20.5%). The “fko 5” has the smallest MAE(RE300) variation 
(values between 4.5% and 10.4%). MAE(RE300) values vary between 4.5% and 17.5% and 
between 4.9% to 17.1%  in the“ckr 5” and “dkq 5” configurations, respectively. It should be noted that 
MAE(RE300) starts with HRR=20 and MAE(RE600) starts with HRR=50, as lower HRRs do not 
generate temperatures higher than 300°C and 600°C.  
• Values of MAE(RE600) present even smaller variations: again, “bqs 5” is the configuration with the 
highest errors (between 5.6% and 13.5%) and “fko 5” the one with lowest values (between 2.9% and 
10.7%). The error for “ckr 5” and “dkq 5” varies between 6.2% and 12.7% and between 3.6% and 
11.4%, respectively. 
• Finally the “ckr 5” configuration was selected because in most cases it had the lowest RMSE and 
MAE. It should be pointed out that this configuration  did not give the best results when the 
MAE(RE300) and MAE(RE600) indexes were considered, but the difference with the minimum 
values of the MAE(RE300) and MAE(RE600) are small as compared to the differences in RMSE and 
MAE. 
A process similar to the one described above was carried out for all 20 sensor groups. Tables 4, 5 and 6 
show the selected configurations, as well as the maximum values of RMSE, MAE, MAE(RE300) and 
MAE(RE600) for each HRR. The configurations are ordered in the table according to the number of sensors 
required to monitor the total tunnel length.  
3.8. Optimal configurations and Pareto fronts 
Finally, a comparison is made of the sensor configurations’ precision (error indexes) and number of sensors, 
after which a set of optimal monitoring configurations are proposed. The number of sensors is chosen as the 
comparison parameter because it is related to the cost of the monitoring system. Solutions are compared 
using the Pareto optimality criterion widely used in multi-objective optimization (see Payá et al. (2008) for an 
example). 
Figs. 12 to 15 plot the maximum values of each error index against the total number of sensors of each 
configuration included in Tables 2 to 4 for HRR values equal to 100, 150 and 200 MW. The results for the 
other six HRR values considered follow the same pattern and are not included in the figures for the sake of 
clarity. To find the sensor configurations that minimize both errors and total sensors, the Pareto front is 
obtained for each HRR. This front is drawn by joining the Pareto optimal configurations which are those that 
cannot be improved in one of the objectives without degrading the other. The configurations that are not 
inside the Pareto front are discarded, as there are others which provide a better estimation of the 
temperatures with fewer sensors. Note that for each value of HRR and Ny, four values of the error indexes 
are plotted in each figure. These are the values of the distances nx of 5, 10, 15 and 20 m between the 
monitored cross sections.  
The number of times that each configuration in Tables 2 to 4 was included in the Pareto front was expressed 
as a percentage. For example, the configuration “cfkor 20” was inside the Pareto front 18 times and outside 
12 times, and so was Pareto optimal in 60% of the cases. The higher this percentage is, the better the 
configuration. These results were represented in the bubble chart in Fig. 16. In this graphic, the sensor 
configurations which had a better performance (were Pareto optimal in at least 70% of the cases) have been 
included.   
 
From the results given in Tables 2 to 4, and Figs. 12 to 16 it can be seen that: 
• According to the Pareto fronts, increasing the number of sensors up to a maximum of 400 
significantly reduces the error index values. The error reduction is smaller when total sensors reach 
600 and is almost negligible when this figure is exceeded. The best configurations using a number of 
sensors close to 400 and to 600 sensors are the “cfkor 10” and the “bdhknqs 10”. 
• The temperature estimation errors can vary significantly according to the sensor configuration 
chosen. For example, both “ckr 10” and “ceimpr  20” have 258 sensors, but “ckr 10” has smaller 
errors than “‘ceimpr 20”. For example, with HRR equal to 70 MW, the error differences are 34.2%, 
19.9 %, 39.4 % and 29.4 % for the RMSE, MAE, MAE(RE300) and MAE(RE600), respectively. This 
indicates that defining the location of the sensors deserves a lot of attention. 
• In cases where a only a small number of sensors can be installed, the “ckr 20”, “ckr 15” or “ckr 10” 
configurations should be used, as they are Pareto optimal in 100%, 100% and 70 % of the cases. 
These configurations use 129, 171 and 258 sensors, respectively, and have a sensor at the crown of 
the tunnel (position “k”) and two sensors around 2 m. above the paved surface (sensors “c” and “r”). 
• When a large number of sensors can be installed, “bdhknqs 5” (1204 sensors) and especially 
“bdhknqs 10” (602 sensors) should be considered as they are Pareto optimal in a very high 
percentage of the cases analyzed. 
• It is important to place a sensor at the crown of the tunnel (sensor ‘k’ in Fig. 6). This is the part of the 
cross section with the highest z coordinate and is where hot gases accumulate and the highest 
temperatures are reached. In Fig. 16 it can be seen that all the best configurations include a sensor 
at this point, and that the configurations in which it is lacking (Ny=4 and Ny=6) are much less likely to 
be a part of the Pareto fronts.  
The final selection of the sensor configuration depends to a large extent on financial considerations and the 
importance of the tunnel for traffic flow, both of which will define the error that can be assumed. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Monitoring temperatures during a tunnel fire is of major importance to improve tunnel resilience, as it can 
provide valuable information to firefighters during the fire event and to engineers in charge of tunnel damage 
assessment and repair work. The proper definition of this work is essential, as it can have a big impact on 
direct and indirect costs and traffic disruptions.  
However, the current methods commonly used in assessing fire damage have limitations when applied to 
tunnels and only provide estimates of the maximum temperatures caused by the fire at specific points. As 
several authors have pointed out, this is not a desirable situation as there is a need to know the temperature 
evolution and maximum temperatures at all points in the tunnel. 
In this context, this paper presents a new method for the optimal placement of high temperature sensors in a 
tunnel that makes it possible to obtain temperature evolution with time at any point of the tunnel lining. The 
method was applied to the case of the Virgolo Tunnel in Italy, where one hundred potential high temperature 
sensor configurations were examined and a set of optimal sensor configurations were proposed. The results 
of the analysis show that: 
• Proper location of the sensors is crucial, as different sensor configurations with the same number of 
sensors give widely differing temperature estimation accuracy. 
• The Pareto optimality criterion was used to define a set of sensor configurations that minimize 
monitoring costs while maximizing temperature estimation accuracy.  
• It is important to place at least three high temperature sensors in each monitored cross section. 
These sensors should be located at the crown and symmetrically on the haunches or side walls of 
the tunnel.  
• There is a threshold value that defines the reasonable maximum number of high temperature 
sensors to be placed in a tunnel. This value was found to be close to 600 sensors in the case study 
analyzed in this paper. Using a higher number of sensors increases the cost of the monitoring 
system without significantly improving the quality of the temperature estimates. 
• The recommended sensor configurations are able to estimate the temperatures along the tunnel with 
a high accuracy. For example, the  “cfkor 10” configuration which uses 430 sensors has the following 
error indexes: RMSE  between 7.4 and 71.7 ºC, MAE between 4.2 and 37ºC, MAE(RE300) between 
5.5 and 10.7% and MAE(RE600) between 4.8 and 14.9%. The error indexes for the “bdhknqs 10”, 
which uses  602 sensors, are: RMSE  between 6.2 and 55 ºC, MAE between 3.1 and 26.5ºC, 
MAE(RE300) between 3.4 and 9.5% and MAE(RE600) between 3.8 and 15.9%.  
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Figure 12. Maximum RMSE versus total number of sensors for HRR=100, 150 and 200 MW (in red, green and blue 
respectively). Dashed lines represent the Pareto front for each HRR. 
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HRR 5 1-2 cars 5 0.5 25 45 6 2 0.2 
HRR 10 Small van, 2-3 cars 10 1 25 45 12 2 0.2 
HRR 20 
Big van, public bus, 
multiple vehicles 
20 2 35 55 12 2.5 0.2 
HRR 30 Bus, empty HGV 30 3 70 100 12 2.5 0.4 
HRR 50 
Combustible load on 
truck 
50 2.5 70  100  12 2.5 0.4 
HRR 70 
HGV load with 
combustibles  
70 3.5 70 100  12 2.5 0.4 
HRR 100 HGV (average) 100 5 70 100 12 2.5 0.4 
HRR 150 
Load with easy 
combustion HGV 
150 7.5 70 100  12 2.5 0.4 
HRR 200 
Limited by oxygen, 
petrol tanker, 
multiple HGVs 
200 10 70  100  12 2.5 0.4 





























ckr 20 129 9.2 13.4 26.7 41.2 68.8 82.2 102.8 120.1 128.6 
ckr 15 171 8.4 12.5 24.1 38.4 61.8 71.7 80.5 100.9 105.9 
chnr 20 172 9.9 13.5 24.7 39.0 64.4 82.2 94.9 109.8 115.2 
cfkor 20 215 8.8 12.4 23.5 36.2 62.2 77.0 88.3 100.0 102.8 
chnr 15 228 9.0 12.5 22.9 37.6 58.5 71.4 77.6 91.2 103.0 
ckr 10 258 7.8 11.1 19.8 32.1 48.5 55.7 67.7 86.2 97.5 
ceimpr 20 258 8.7 12.6 23.3 35.7 62.7 74.8 89.9 99.0 106.4 
cfkor 15 285 8.1 11.6 21.1 35.6 58.5 66.4 71.7 79.6 83.9 
bdhknqs 20 301 8.0 12.4 22.0 34.3 55.8 71.3 82.4 92.5 99.9 
ceimpr 15 342 8.0 11.2 21.6 33.4 59.5 67.0 72.3 78.1 83.8 
cimr 10 344 7.9 10.7 19.0 30.8 47.8 56.4 61.3 77.4 92.6 
bdhknqs 15 399 7.1 10.9 20.5 31.0 51.0 61.1 65.8 72.8 73.4 
cfkor 10 430 7.4 9.9 17.5 27.2 43.3 53.2 54.7 64.3 71.7 
ckr 5 516 7.5 10.4 18.6 28.4 45.8 53.0 63.0 82.7 91.9 
ceimpr 10 516 7.1 9.7 17.1 26.4 43.0 48.2 51.7 61.9 68.5 
bdhknqs 10 602 6.2 9.5 16.4 24.2 37.6 42.8 46.7 52.0 55.0 
cimr 5 688 7.4 9.5 17.0 26.5 42.2 51.1 56.5 73.7 85.0 
cfkor 5 860 6.9 8.5 15.0 22.5 37.9 46.2 50.2 57.5 62.0 
ceimpr 5 1032 6.4 8.3 14.6 20.7 34.5 41.4 45.3 53.7 59.2 
bdhknqs 5 1204 5.2 7.8 13.1 18.1 28.7 34.0 38.0 41.8 42.4 


























ckr 20 129 5.1 7.6 14.4 21.0 34.6 42.7 54.7 67.8 73.3 
ckr 15 171 4.9 7.2 13.1 19.3 30.8 37.1 45.3 58.2 63.7 
chnr 20 172 5.9 7.9 14.1 21.8 35.3 45.7 52.8 62.9 67.4 
cfkor 20 215 5.1 6.9 12.4 18.7 30.6 39.0 45.6 50.5 52.5 
chnr 15 228 5.4 7.3 13.2 20.8 32.4 40.0 45.9 54.9 61.8 
ckr 10 258 4.6 6.6 11.4 17.0 25.8 31.8 39.8 51.7 59.9 
ceimpr 20 258 4.9 7.0 12.1 18.5 30.2 38.1 44.7 49.8 53.3 
cfkor 15 285 4.7 6.4 11.3 18.1 28.3 33.4 38.3 41.1 43.3 
bdhknqs 20 301 3.9 6.9 11.8 17.3 26.6 33.4 40.1 44.1 44.9 
ceimpr 15 342 4.7 6.2 11.1 17.1 27.3 32.6 38.1 39.8 43.6 
cimr 10 344 4.8 6.4 11.1 17.0 26.7 32.8 36.8 46.6 54.8 
bdhknqs 15 399 3.6 6.1 10.7 15.2 23.1 27.5 31.7 34.7 34.7 
cfkor 10 430 4.2 5.7 9.7 14.6 23.0 28.3 30.6 33.6 37.0 
ckr 5 516 4.4 6.2 10.7 15.5 24.2 29.9 36.7 48.6 55.2 
ceimpr 10 516 4.1 5.6 9.3 14.0 21.9 26.2 29.0 33.1 36.3 
bdhknqs 10 602 3.1 5.4 8.9 12.2 18.0 21.0 23.6 26.0 26.5 
cimr 5 688 4.5 5.8 9.9 15.0 23.5 29.2 33.7 43.4 49.8 
cfkor 5 860 3.9 5.0 8.4 12.5 20.1 24.4 26.6 29.2 31.3 
ceimpr 5 1032 3.7 4.7 7.9 11.5 18.1 22.2 25.0 27.8 30.4 
bdhknqs 5 1204 2.7 4.5 7.2 9.7 14.2 16.6 18.8 20.7 20.2 

































ckr 20 129 31.1 22.6 13.2 10.3 9.2 9.7 9.7 27.5 21.7 17.7 14.5 12.0 
ckr 15 171 29.7 19.1 11.5 8.6 7.4 8.4 8.8 24.2 16.8 12.4 11.1 9.6 
chnr 20 172 18.9 17.8 13.5 10.7 9.0 9.0 9.3 15.8 16.9 16.6 12.6 10.4 
cfkor 20 215 27.7 13.7 9.9 8.3 7.5 6.7 7.0 23.3 14.3 12.6 9.6 8.2 
chnr 15 228 17.1 15.4 12.0 9.4 7.5 8.0 8.7 13.9 15.2 12.1 10.1 9.3 
ckr 10 258 21.5 14.8 9.0 6.9 6.4 7.6 8.5 15.3 11.3 10.0 9.7 9.0 
ceimpr 20 258 25.2 13.6 10.6 9.6 8.1 6.7 6.6 21.6 14.7 13.3 9.6 8.7 
cfkor 15 285 24.5 11.8 8.4 6.9 5.9 5.6 6.2 18.7 11.9 9.0 6.8 6.1 
bdhknqs 20 301 20.5 13.9 10.3 9.1 7.7 6.9 5.3 19.8 15.5 12.6 9.7 8.0 
ceimpr 15 342 23.8 11.2 9.3 8.2 6.9 5.6 5.7 21.0 12.9 10.1 6.8 6.2 
cimr 10 344 11.4 12.8 9.1 6.9 5.6 6.8 7.8 15.5 10.6 8.1 7.7 7.5 
bdhknqs 15 399 19.9 11.8 8.7 7.2 6.2 5.8 4.4 17.0 11.5 9.1 7.1 5.7 
cfkor 10 430 10.7 8.5 6.3 5.3 4.4 4.6 5.5 14.9 9.4 5.4 4.6 4.8 
ckr 5 516 17.8 13.1 8.7 6.6 6.0 7.2 8.0 12.7 10.8 9.2 8.8 8.2 
ceimpr 10 516 11.6 8.6 7.2 6.5 5.4 4.7 4.9 16.6 8.0 5.8 4.7 4.6 
bdhknqs 10 602 9.5 8.4 6.6 5.8 5.0 4.7 3.4 15.9 7.6 5.9 4.8 3.8 
cimr 5 688 8.7 10.2 7.9 6.1 5.2 6.3 7.2 12.0 9.0 7.2 6.9 6.5 
cfkor 5 860 8.1 6.5 5.1 4.2 3.7 3.9 4.9 9.1 6.7 4.1 3.4 3.8 
ceimpr 5 1032 8.0 6.8 6.2 5.6 4.7 4.0 4.2 13.8 6.7 4.5 3.6 3.7 
bdhknqs 5 1204 6.6 6.2 5.5 4.7 4.2 4.0 2.8 8.2 5.8 4.4 3.7 2.8 
Table 4. Maximum MAE(RE300) and  MAE(RE600) errors for the selected configurations. Pareto-optimal configurations 
(see  section 3.8) are in bold. 
 
 
 
